

8 OCTOBER 1947

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Of
WITNESSES

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I N D E X
Of
EXHIBITS
(none)

Wednesday, 8 October 1947

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
at 0930.

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Appearances:

For the Tribunal, all Members sitting, with
the exception of: HONORABLE JUSTICE R. B. PAL, Member
from India and HONORABLE JUSTICE HENRI BERNARD, Member
from the Republic of France, not sitting from 0930 to
1600; HONORABLE JUSTICE MYRON C. CRAMER, Member from
the United States of America, not sitting from 1500
to 1600.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

For the Defense Section, same as before.

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(English to Japanese and Japanese
to English interpretation was made by the
Language Section, IMTFE.)

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1 MARSHALL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: With the Tribunal's permission,
4 the accused TOGO will be absent from the court room for
5 the whole of the morning session conferring with his
6 counsel.

7 MR. Mattice.

8 - - -

9 S E I S H I R O I T A G A K I, an accused, resumed
10 the stand and testified through Japanese interpreters
11 as follows:

12 DIRECT EXAMINATION

13 MR. MATTICE (Continued): Resuming reading
14 of exhibit 3316, beginning on page 26, III:

15 "III. IN MY DAYS AS THE COMMANDER OF THE
16 FIFTH DIVISION. (Between 1 March 1937 - 3 June 1938)

17 "1. On 1 March 1937, I was transferred from
18 the position of the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung
19 Army to Hiroshima, in Japan, as Commander of the Fifth
20 Division. At that time the 5th Division was a division
21 on peace footing and I, the divisional commander, was
22 in charge of controlling all my subordinate units and
23 responsible for the military administration within my
24 jurisdiction. Regarding other matters, however, I was
25 not in a position to state my opinion with any authority

1 nor to give any advice.

2 "2. When the Lukouchiao Incident occurred
3 on 7 July 1937, I was, as usual, on duty at the head-
4 quarters of the 5th Division in Hiroshima. I learned
5 about the incident by reading about it in the news-
6 papers of the following morning. I did not consider
7 it was serious, as I believed that it was only a trouble
8 that an expeditionary unit usually has, and that the
9 incident would soon be settled on the spot. I did not
10 dream that this incident would develop into such a
11 great affair as the China-Japanese Incident. Knowing
12 that the Japanese policy at that time was localization
13 and the settlement on the spot, I expected that it would
14 be so settled.

15 "3. However, the negotiations between Japanese
16 and Chinese armies on the spot, which was based on the
17 Japanese policy of localization, was ineffectual.
18 Despite a hope for such settlement, owing to the de-
19 fiant attitude of the Chinese, the situation became
20 anything but reassuring.

21 "In this situation, on 27 July, an emergency
22 mobilization order was issued to the Fifth Division.
23 On 2 August of the same year the emergency mobilization
24 had been completed. The first and second contingents
25 left the Ujina Harbour on 3rd and 7th of August, re-

1 spectively. After passing Korea and South Manchuria
2 by railroad they reached Peiping, and then participated
3 in various battles in North China. At the end of May
4 1938, on order from Tokyo, I left the position of the
5 Commander of the Fifth Division and was en route to
6 Tokyo.

7 "4. In December 1937 the main force of our
8 Fifth Division was concentrating in the direction of
9 Paoting from Shansi. When I was in Paoting on 17 De-
10 cember of the same year, I heard of the formal entry
11 into Nanking of the Japanese Army despatched to Central
12 China, but I had no knowledge of or responsibility con-
13 cerning the so-called 'Nanking Incident.'

14 "5. As Commander of the Fifth Division, I
15 only did my duty in accordance with the order of my
16 superior commander -- the army commander. In the con-
17 trol and command of the subordinate units, I paid
18 special attention to the establishment of stern mili-
19 tary discipline. Above all, I warned my men against
20 any misbehaviour toward the residents. If a soldier
21 did anything wrong, he would have been punished accord-
22 ing to military law. In addition to such punishment,
23 both the commander of the unit to which that soldier
24 belonged and the responsible persons for the control
25 of that soldier were punished according to their

1 responsibility. And thus, I tried to enhance the
2 prestige of the Army.

3 "IV. The Circumstances of my Appointment
4 as War Minister.

5 "1. At the end of April or the beginning of
6 May 1938, when I was at Ihsien in Shantung Province,
7 North China, as the Commander of the Fifth Division,
8 Mr. FURUNO, Inosuke, who had been the director of the
9 Domei News Agency, unexpectedly visited me as Premier
10 KONOYE's representative, to convey the Premier's de-
11 sire to me. The gist of KONOYE's desire was as follows:

12 "Despite the KONOYE Cabinet's policy of local-
13 ization, since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident,
14 the war was extended from North China to Central China.
15 In view of such situation, it was necessary to have a
16 person, as Minister of War, who would be able to change
17 the policy toward China to a peace policy and who could
18 carry it out. For this purpose, considering my career
19 and my ideas, KONOYE thought I was the best man for
20 the post. Therefore, with that in mind, KONOYE wished
21 to know whether I would accept the post as Minister
22 of War.

23 "I knew that Premier KONOYE's intention coin-
24 cided with my idea at that time, namely the withdrawal
25 of the entire Japanese forces and the peaceful settle-

1 ment of the Japan-China conflict. Later, toward the
2 end of May of the same year, ANAMI, the Chief of the
3 Personal Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, visited me,
4 carrying the official informal order for my appoint-
5 ment as Minister of War, which same had the recommend-
6 ation of the big three directors of the army (the
7 Sub-Chief of the General Staff, TADA, the Inspector-
8 General of Military Education, NISHIO, and the Min-
9 ister of War, SUGIYAWA), and requested me to accept
10 that position.

11 "I decided to accept the appointment and went
12 to Tokyo. On 3 June of the same year, I took office
13 as the Minister of War.

14 "2. My fundamental attitude as Minister
15 of War.

16 "(a) Japan and China must not contend with
17 each other, but join hands. This was the consistent
18 principle of the Japanese diplomacy toward China. How-
19 ever, the Japanese efforts towards localization and
20 settlement on the spot were all in vain, and a local
21 conflict that occurred in North China between the
22 Japanese and the Chinese gradually developed into a
23 large-scale conflict between the two nations, extend-
24 ing over a large area. While Japan was thus reluct-
25 antly forced into such a situation, the Soviet Union,

1 to the North, increased her national strength enor-
2 mously after completing several units of her five-
3 year-plan. Her armaments in the Far East were over-
4 whelmingly superior, threatening Japanese rear gate.
5 On the other hand, Anglo-American powers were in-
6 creasingly assuming an attitude of aiding Chiang and
7 interrupting our military movements.

8 "Especially, we were concerned about the
9 United States pressure upon Japan (consisting mainly
10 of financial pressure). If such things would go on,
11 Japan should be doomed to stand alone internationally
12 under the encirclement by Britain, the United States,
13 Soviet Union and China. Therefore, Japan must ac-
14 complish peace with China, without a moment's delay.
15 And, with regard to the relation with China, I firmly
16 believed that the two countries must bring to an end
17 all the past conflict between them and rebuild mutual
18 diplomacy on the basis of a broad point of view,
19 thereby realizing mutual benefits, equality and har-
20 monious relations.

21 "(b) Based on the above-mentioned fundamental
22 attitudes, I, as the Minister of War, decided the
23 outline of the policy for dealing with the state af-
24 fairs as follows:

25 "As the policy for the fighting forces:

1 "To firmly establish military discipline
2 and to attempt maintenance of fighting power against
3 the menace of the Soviet Union. As the policy of
4 state, to alter peace terms with China and to accom-
5 plish peaceful settlement quickly. To attempt an
6 innovation in the management of national government,
7 recognizing the fact that the situation is grave, in
8 order to reinforce our defending powers against the
9 Soviet menace and to supplement fighting materials
10 which are being rapidly consumed as the policy for
11 China, to lead the debouchment by the military power
12 to the end, to attempt transfer of military strength,
13 and adjustment of the front line, thereby stabilizing
14 the situation in the occupied area, and to endeavor
15 to bring about a settlement of peace with Chiang Kai-
16 shek. As the policy regarding the Soviet Union, to
17 keep watch of her debouchment and to maintain peace
18 with her. As the policy regarding Britain and France,
19 to endeavor to get them to stop their Chiang aid and
20 act in concert with us for terminating the hostilities.
21 As the policy for Germany and Italy, to ask of each of
22 them their co-operation in the settlement of the Japan-
23 China hostilities. To maintain friendship with the
24 United States and trust that friendship would be the
25 means of bringing about an end to the China-Japan
hostilities.

1 "3. My activities as Minister of War (3 June
2 1938 - 29 August 1939).

3 "(1) It was immediately after the Hsuehou
4 battle that I took office as Minister of War. At that
5 time, as it was believed that the Hankow Operation
6 would be unavoidable in view of the general situation,
7 the Central Supreme Command of the army (the Army
8 Department of the Imperial General Headquarters) had
9 just commenced preparations for that operation. The
10 circumstances at that time (about June 1938) were as
11 outlined below:

12 "(a) The peace terms to be offered to China
13 should not be so exacting as the ones we had proposed
14 when Mr. Trautman acted as go-between. Unless the
15 Japanese authorities would modify the terms and make
16 them more certain and reasonable, it appeared unlikely
17 that the Chinese would accept them. However, both the
18 Japanese public opinion and the government's policy
19 had still been far from further reducing those terms.

20 "(b) In order to conclude peace with China,
21 we had to make it possible to deal with Chiang Kai-shek.
22 Nevertheless, being confronted with the KONOYE decla-
23 ration of 16 January, this year (1938), which included
24 the statement that Japan would not deal with the Kuo-
25 mintang Government (even though Premier KONOYE himself

1 understood the wrongfulness of that declaration)
2 things were not such as were likely to develop a ten-
3 dency favourable to the further re-examination of
4 this declaration as a national policy.

5 "(c) As one of the important keys for the
6 reorganization of the KONOYE Cabinet, enjoying the great
7 confidence of the people, Mr. UGAKI succeeded Mr.
8 HIROTA and a little ahead of my entry took office as
9 the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 26 May. However,
10 it was still not long after his inauguration and no
11 progress had been made about his concrete policy.

12 "(d) China asked the League of Nations for
13 help and was successful in making the league resolve
14 to help China.

15 "(e) The Japanese Supreme Command had counted
16 greatly on the Hsuechow Battle as the decisive battle
17 with the main force of the Chinese Central Army, for
18 bringing about the termination of operations, the end
19 of war and the settlement of the incident. However,
20 owing to the great difference in strength and the
21 extent of the fighting area, the Japanese finally
22 could not achieve its strategical object, thereby
23 missing the prize as well as the opportunity, to settle
24 the incident peacefully. Compared with this, the
25 Chinese concentrated great strength in front of Hankow

1 and had been vigorously preparing for counter attacks.
2 If things would go on as they were the few Japanese
3 forces which were posted in many scattered places in
4 a large area would be exposed to extreme danger.

5 "Therefore, the Army Supreme Command con-
6 sidered that the only way for us was to deliver another
7 counterattack on the Chinese and to make it a turning
8 point for seizing the opportunity for peace. Thus
9 the Supreme Command was obliged to prepare for the
10 Hankow Operation; and some parts of our forces began
11 to move.

12 "(f) On the other hand, we would discern
13 that there were important defects in our preparations
14 for defense against the Soviet Union in the north and
15 that that weakness on our part would increase in the
16 future. Under such circumstances, I, having but
17 recently assumed my post, could not help being aware
18 of the extreme difficulties of the talk of leading the
19 situation to peace. That is to say, we had to aim at
20 the end of the Hankow Operation for the purpose of
21 taking the next opportunity for peace, while on the
22 other hand, we had to devise measures that would become
23 materials of the peace settlement.

24 "At the same time, the situation required us
25 to replace the fighting materials that were being

1 consumed rapidly and not to neglect to maintain the
2 national power for the purpose of defending against
3 the Soviet Union.

4 "The reinforcement of the various emergency
5 policies that were necessary for the national mobili-
6 zation (exhibit 856) and the revision of the plan of
7 demand and supply of important materials (exhibit 857)
8 were made for remedying the defects of the defending
9 strength and was not for preparing for aggressive war.

10 "(2) Although Hankow Operation (Canton Opera-
11 tion was a subsidiary one to Hankow Operation) was
12 planned and executed, as above mentioned, by the
13 Japanese High Command with a view to cover its own weak
14 points and to make a turning point for the termination
15 of hostilities and peaceful settlement, its object of
16 immediate peace could not be attained even after the
17 ending of the operation (Hankow fell on October 27,
18 1937) and the year of 1938 passed over fruitlessly.

19 "The important matters with which I was con-
20 fronted, during this period, as the War Minister of
21 the KONOYE Cabinet, were the following, and the circum-
22 stances resulting from executing her measures forced
23 Japan into a prolonged war it feared most.

24 "(a) To keep our relation with Soviet Russia
25 tranquil was one of the absolute essentials. It was

1 also an important factor in exhibiting internally and
2 externally, the safety of her national defense. So,
3 Japan was quite astonished when the Chang Ku-feng
4 Incident unexpectedly broke out in July-August, 1938,
5 when she was still engaged in the task of preparing
6 for the Hankow Operation.

7 "In dealing with this incident, I hoped for
8 settlement by diplomatic negotiations, embodying the
9 governmental principle of non-expansion, and endeavored
10 to achieve immediate and local settlement with accord
11 of views between the War Ministry and the General Staff.
12 Disregarding anticipated serious disadvantages, the
13 Japanese Army firmly stuck to the principle of locali-
14 zation and non-expansion and was barely able to termina-
15 te the incident before it became too serious. It brought
16 about, however, greater need for attention to the
17 menace in the north and realization of the superiority
18 of the Soviet mechanized forces over the Japanese
19 forces and, consequently, lessened the margin of the
20 Japanese preparedness for China. Thus, it resulted
21 in doubts, internally and externally, of the preparedness
22 of Japan.

23 "(b) Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese
24 incident, Japan refrained from establishing military
25 government, and stood upon the policy and principle of

1 leaving the civil administration and maintenance of
2 peace to the Chinese. Nevertheless, not a few such
3 accomplishments were due to the management by Japanese
4 (taking the military operations into consideration) in
5 the Department of Special Affairs. This placed a con-
6 siderable load on the army. Thus, the organization
7 of the China Affairs Board (i.e. Koa-yin) was proposed
8 by the army, and adopted by the cabinet as the national
9 policy, of relieving the army of their tasks with a
10 view of bringing about the unification of administration.

11 "With such views of organization as above
12 mentioned, the China Affairs Board was established on
13 December 18, 1938, as the unifying organ, with the
14 Premier as president and the Ministers of Navy and War
15 and Foreign Affairs as vice-presidents. It was about
16 the middle of the following March when the liaison
17 offices on the spots started their work in cooperation
18 with the Chinese Administration, to promote political,
19 economical and cultural measures. The intervention
20 of the army was held to the minimum.

21
22 "(c) It was sine qua non for the realization
23 of peace to amend the peace proposals to China, and
24 convert Japan to a policy of dealing with Mr. Chiang
25 Kai-shek. I, therefore, attached prime significance
to re-examining the fundamentals of the national policy

1 regarding the adjustment of the relations between
2 Japan and China; making the true intention of Japan
3 understandable to China, demonstrating to the world
4 that it be embodied in the national policy, and be
5 carried out faithfully; and developing our national
6 policies so as to make for good prospects for the re-
7 alization of peace.

8 "In the KONOYE statement issued at the time
9 of the fall of Wuhan Three Cities on 3 November 1938
10 (exhibit 268) Japan hoped to establish the relations
11 of mutual aid, ranging over all the fields of politics,
12 economy, culture, etc., establish international justice,
13 achieve the anti-communism objective, create a new
14 culture, and realize the economic combination, between
15 Japan and China.

16 "In the interest of realizing those policies,
17 the Policy of Adjusting New Relations between Japan
18 and China (exhibit 269) was decided on the 30th of the
19 same month. Furthermore, as a detailed explanation
20 the KONOYE statement (exhibits 268, 2535) was issued on
21 22 December 1938. This declared to the world, that
22 it was self-evident that what Japan wanted of China
23 was not territory, nor reimbursement of war expenses,
24 but that Japan was willing, not only to respect the
25 sovereignty of China, but also to withdraw her

1 extraterritoriality, as well as to give consideration
2 to returning the settlement. I did my utmost, as War
3 Minister, to promote that policy. However, China's
4 reaction, especially Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's, was very
5 weak. It was, therefore, not a suitable time to carry
6 on peace negotiations.

7 "(d) Before that, in the interests of peace,
8 it had been deemed advisable to join hands with impor-
9 tant persons of China who were believed to possess an
10 ardor for peace, to aid them, and hope to bring about
11 peace. In July 1938 Premier KONOYE gave the instruction
12 to Mr. BANZAI, Rihachiro (recommended by UGAKI, War
13 Minister) to make liaison with Mr. Tang Shao-i and
14 Mr. Wu Pei-fu, men of high reputation who had a desire
15 for peace, and asked them for their cooperation. The
16 army sent Lieutenant General DOHIHARA, and the navy,
17 Lieutenant General TSUDA, to cooperate in it, but the
18 plan failed, due to the assassination of Mr. Tang
19 Shao-i in December 1938.

20 "(e) The problem of the coalition of Japan,
21 Germany and Italy was already under study by the affairs
22 authorities of the three departments of Army, Navy,
23 and External Affairs before I occupied the post of
24 War Minister (about May 1938). As the proposal of
25 Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of Germany, arrived

1 in the first part of August 1938, we sent a formal
2 answer after consulting the Five Ministers' Conference
3 and waited for the formal proposal of Germany. Early
4 in November, the initial proposal to be used as the
5 basis of discussion arrived from Germany. I wanted
6 to utilize it as a means to obtain Sino-Japanese peace
7 immediately after the end of Hangkao Operation, and
8 proposed the discussion of this matter before the Five
9 Ministers' Conference on 11 November. But, my proposal
10 met with difficulty in the accord of cabinet opinion,
11 and we became unable to make the speedy conclusion of
12 the Japan-German negotiation serve to accomplish the
13 rapid realization of Sino-Japanese peace.

14 "(f) Japan's withdrawal from the League of
15 Nations, which was decided through consultation in the
16 conference of the Board of Council on 2 November 1938
17 (exhibit 271) was, as was made clear in that conference
18 carried out because Japan could not continue coopera-
19 tion with the league and, at the same time, maintain
20 its national dignity.

21 "I made no statements at this conference.

22
23 "(g) The conclusion of an agreement between
24 Japan and Germany regarding cultural cooperation which
25 was discussed in the Board of Council Conference on
22 November 1938 (exhibit 589), it was not Japan's

1 intention to conclude this kind of treaty with Germany
2 only, but with other nations as the circumstances
3 dictated, and contribute to general purposes of dip-
4 lomacy, and it was evident that it did not have any
5 political meaning.

6 "(h) It is as mentioned before that the
7 policy of adjusting the new relations between Japan
8 and China was discussed in the Five Ministers' Con-
9 ference on 25 November 1938, and decided by the Imperial
10 Council on the 30th of the same month. The project
11 of securing Hainan Island, proposed by the navy at
12 that time, was approved by the same conference as a
13 purely military measure and a temporary one which came
14 about inevitably in order to make this blockade opera-
15 tion more effective, and it was hoped that same would
16 accelerate the solution of the incident.

17 "(i) That Japan should pay careful attention
18 regarding the observance of the laws of war in militar
19 activities; respect and protect the interests of
20 third powers in China; make it a principle to remove
21 the temporary obstacles made necessary by military
22 operations, and restore former conditions as soon as
23 possible after the war. That Japan would stand by
24 the principle of equal opportunity, was often declared
25 by the Japanese Government in answer to the complaints

1 of the third powers (among others, America) up to
2 October or November 1938, and Japan tried faithfully
3 to carry it out.

4 "However, that the third powers pressed Japan
5 for strict observance of treaties which did not con-
6 form to the current situation, and utilized it as an
7 excuse for assisting Chiang, and the tendency of the
8 powers to be against Japan and aid Chiang became more
9 pronounced.

10 "Thus, the KONOYE Cabinet, being unable to
11 accomplish the solving of the problem of securing
12 Sino-Japanese peace, was forced to resign.

13 "(3) When the HIRANUMA Cabinet was organized
14 on January 4, 1939, succeeding to the KONOYE Cabinet,
15 I remained as War Minister upon the earnest request
16 of Mr. HIRANUMA. My fundamental attitude as War Minis-
17 ter was the same as when I was in the KONOYE Cabinet.
18 As before stated, as it became almost impossible to
19 bring about a speedy peace between Japan and China,
20 there was nothing left to do but to take measures to
21 cope with the existing situation for the purpose of
22 gradually breaking down the Chinese anti-Japanese
23 attitude, and that meant the demonstration, on the one
24 hand, of our determination not to shun even a long war,
25

1 and, on the other hand, to lay great importance on the
2 principle of urging our policy by measures other than
3 the military activities. Although this doctrine
4 was carried out ever since the end of the KONOYE Cab-
5 inet, it was intensified in the period of the HIRANUMA
6 Cabinet.

7 "Now, the principal matters dealt with while
8 I was War Minister of the HIRANUMA Cabinet were as
9 follows:

10 "(a) The bill 'General Principles of the
11 Replenishment of the Productive Faculties' (exhibit
12 No. 842) drafted by the Planning Board and approved
13 by the cabinet meeting of January 1939, was the one
14 previously studied at the War Ministry on the basis
15 of 'The Plans of the Replenishment of the Important
16 Industries' (5-year Industrial Plan) proposed by the
17 General Staff Office at about April of the 12th year
18 of Showa (1937), and transferred to the cabinet council.
19 The real purpose of the plan was to establish Japan's
20 economy, in order to acquire security of national
21 defense against the menace of the Soviet Union, and
22 thereby secure the safety of Manchukuo in general so
23 that our plans might be realized in accordance with
24 the 5-year plan for the development of Manchurian
25 industries projected by the Government of Manchukuo.

1 But as it had taken a long time in various studies on
2 the plans, the plan was changed to a 4-year plan,
3 and the scope was also diminished, as was testified
4 by the witness OKADA, Kikusaburo (March 30, 22nd year
5 of Showa - 1947). Thus, just at the juncture of our
6 unavoidable change of course to a long-period war,
7 our plans were such that they could not keep pace with
8 the new situation.

9 "(b) Referring to the participation of Man-
10 chukuo and Hungary in the Anti-Comintern Pact, dis-
11 cussed at the Privy Council on February 22 of the same
12 year (exhibit No. 491), this much may be said; that,
13 in view of the aim of the Anti-Comintern Pact an
14 increase of participating powers was always welcome,
15 and, accordingly, Japan merely intended to strengthen
16 the pact quantitatively so that the level of her inter-
17 national position under the aforementioned circumstances
18 might be raised. Negotiation was also under way
19 between Japan and Germany about the method of quali-
20 tatively strengthening the spirit of the Anti-Comintern
21 to meet the attitude of the Comintern and the power
22 behind it, the Soviet Union. I attended this session
23 of the Privy Council, but did not make any statement.

24 "(c) Concerning the story appearing in the
25 Japan Advertiser of March 17 of the same year (exhibit

1 No. 2200) purporting to report a Diet speech by me,
2 I never made such a speech as appeared in that paper
3 in all my utterances throughout the whole sessions
4 of the 75th Imperial Diet of that year.

5 "(d) Concerning the question of closing the
6 British Settlement at Tientsin, Premier HIRANUMA
7 informed me about June 26 or 27 that the British had
8 made a proposal wishing the question to be carried to
9 diplomatic negotiations at Tokyo, but as the idea of
10 the army must be predominant in this affair, he wished
11 to know the intention of the army before he would have
12 liaised with the Foreign Office authorities. I at
13 once agreed to that proposal. We summoned the repre-
14 sentatives from the spot to Tokyo, and had them
15 cooperate in the talk so that the elimination of the
16 differences in views between the authorities at the
17 center and at the spot be effected; thus in endeavoring
18 to lead the parley toward success we achieved our
19 purpose so far as the problem of the public peace was
20 concerned. On the problem of general principles we
21 also succeeded in the issue of the Anglo-Japanese
22 Joint Declaration on July 24.

23
24 "(e) The problem of the American loan: In
25 view of the success of the Anglo-Japanese talk as
above mentioned, I believed that we could eventually

1 find solution of the problems vis-a-vis the British.
2 In regard to our relations with America, I believed
3 that we might perhaps improve them, when the loan nego-
4 tiations with America, which had been pending since
5 the previous January, carried on by civilians and
6 supported by Mr. HIRANUMA, should succeed.

7 (f) The problem of Mr. Wang Chao-ling: As
8 I felt that a good opportunity was approaching for the
9 realization of peace, I asked Mr. Wang Chao-ming to
10 accelerate the peace movement.
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1 "(g) In regard to the Nomonhan Affairs, I
2 endeavoured, after deliberation with the Supreme
3 Command, and with the consent of the Cabinet, to bring
4 about a speedy settlement, approving the policy of the
5 Kwantung Army, which was to settle the matter locally
6 and defensively.

7 "(h) On the negotiation between Japan, Germany
8 and Italy I thought it was the way to relieve the
9 Japanese from death by suffocation; to save continental
10 China; to elevate the international position of Japan;
11 to cause the Chinese Government to give up her policy
12 of tolerance to communism and resistance to Japan,
13 in order to give the Powers opportunities to turn China
14 to the cause of anti-communism, co-prosperity and
15 co-existence, and at the same time strengthen her
16 defense against the militaristic and communistic menace
17 of Russia in the north.

18 "At the first five-ministers conference of
19 the HIRANUMA cabinet, the counter-proposal of the
20 Foreign Office against the German proposition received
21 at the beginning of January was discussed. After it
22 was revised to some extent, the proposition was made
23 the instruction, and then, the conference decided to
24 send to Europe a group of special envoys composed of
25 persons from the Army, the Navy and the Foreign Office.

1 They sailed on 2nd February. The essence of the
2 instruction the envoys took with them was as follows:

3 "The main objective was Russia, but Britain
4 and France might sometimes come within the objective,
5 according to situations. Military assistance would be
6 given if the matter concerned Russia. When Britain
7 and France were under consideration, it would depend
8 on the situation. For instance, in case of their being
9 Bolshevized, the matter of military assistance and its
10 extent would subjectively be decided. Another mission
11 of the envoys was to explain it to the world as an
12 extension of the anti-communistic agreement. Never-
13 theless, the German side, aiming at the general politi-
14 cal effect, requested relaxation of the above limitation
15 of militaristic assistance against Third Powers, except
16 Russia, to which the Japanese Government, after repeated
17 discussions, sent a message from Mr. HIRANUMA to Hitler
18 on May 5 and told him he should appreciate that Japan's
19 position was such that it could not relax the limitation
20 regarding assistance against Third Powers other than
21 Russia, and asking that Germany concede that point.
22 But just at that time complications gradually began to
23 set in. Mr. Wantiao-ming visited Tokyo (June 1st) and
24 the problem concerning the blockade of the British
25 settlement in Tientsin occurred (June 14), followed by

1 the attack of Nomonhan (June 15) by Russian and
2 Mongolian troops, while in Europe the situation was
3 threatening on account of the occurrence of the Danzig
4 question.

5 "Meanwhile, in view of there being no
6 alternative but to require Germany to concede, I
7 dispatched Major General MACHIJIRI, the Chief of
8 the War Service Bureau, on 11 August, to request
9 German Attache Ott to make a concession on the part
10 of Germany. However, the conclusion of the non-invasion
11 treaty between Germany and Soviet Russia was officially
12 announced on August 22, and that ended the matter of
13 the proposed pact. Thus Prime Minister HIRANUMA, on
14 the 23rd, indicated his intention of resigning, and with
15 which I agreed. After presenting our resignations to
16 the Throne, I conferred with the three heads and
17 recommended Lieutenant General TADA, who advocated
18 peace enthusiastically, to become Minister of War.
19 I resigned my post with the resignation of the HIRANUMA
20 cabinet on August 29, 1939, and was appointed as a
21 member of the General Staff (a sinecure office).
22

23 "V. The period during which I held the
24 office of the Chief of the Staff of the China Expe-
25 ditionary Army (Spet. 12, 1939 - July 7, 1941).

"Throughout the period of my being the War

1 Minister I was sincerely desirous of restoring an early
2 peace between Japan and China and of evacuating the
3 Japanese forces from the whole Chinese territory. For
4 that purpose, I took every possible measure and did
5 what I could to attain the object speedily. However,
6 it was regrettable that, on account of the situation,
7 I was obliged to resign my post in the cabinet, leaving
8 the China Incident unsettled.

9 "On September 12, 1939, when the General Head-
10 quarters of the China Expeditionary Army was organized,
11 I was unexpectedly appointed as the Chief of Staff
12 under Commander-General NISHIO, and left for the post
13 in Nanking, where I remained up to July 7, 1941. Mean-
14 while, according to the actual situation in the field,
15 I tried strenuously to bring to a speedy settlement
16 the problem of restoration of a peace between Japan
17 and China, which I had been unable to realize while
18 War Minister.

19 "(a) As to our military operations, meantime,
20 there was nothing but small, supplementary operations
21 in order to strengthen the blockade of the supply
22 route to the fighting strength of the Chungking regime.
23 So we tried to secure our occupying areas, maintain
24 public order and stabilize the living of the people.

25 "(b) The collaboration with Wang's Govern-

1 ment was chiefly in charge of Ambassador ABE, but the
2 Expeditionary Army gave facilities and assistance to
3 the Ambassador, to the extent that it did not interfere
4 with the military operations. In particular it support-
5 ed Mr. Wang Chao-ming's 'National Salvation Peace
6 Movement' and wished the Nanking Government to aim
7 ultimately at joining with the Chungking Government.

8 "(c) Since the possibility of peace negoti-
9 ation with Mr. Chiang Kai-shek through the offices of
10 Mr. Sun Tzu-chieh, a younger brother of Mr. Sun Tzu-wan,
11 was found by the Hongkong Organ early in 1940, I support-
12 ed it most enthusiastically and was ready to meet Mr.
13 Chiang Kai-shek myself in Changsha. In anticipation
14 of its success, I requested the delay of the establish-
15 ment of Wang's Government, but, despite our wishes,
16 the negotiation ended in a failure.

17 "(d) In January, 1941 Mr. Chang Yen-hsiang,
18 who was then in Peiping, informed me of the desire of
19 Doctor Steward, the President of the Yenshing University,
20 to have a talk with me. As I thought it highly desirable
21 to inform Doctor Steward of our attitude of seeking a
22 speedy settlement of the Incident, and to obtain his
23 opinion and assistance, based on deep experience, I
24 dispatched a member of the staff to get in touch with
25 Doctor Steward, who agreed to convey our wishes to the

1 President of the United States that she would act as a
2 mediator in an endeavor to solve the Sino-Japanese
3 Incident amicably. So I advised the central military
4 authorities to that effect and wished them to earnestly
5 promote peace, but, later on, the American-Japanese
6 negotiations became so aggravated that we could not
7 obtain any result.

8 "(e) The South China Expeditionary Army in
9 Canton was, by orders of the Imperial Headquarters as
10 of July 5, 1940, released from the command of our China
11 Expeditionary Army and placed under the jurisdiction of
12 the Imperial Headquarters. Toward the end of September
13 in the same year, a detachment of the South China
14 Expeditionary Army was, by order of Imperial Headquarters
15 ordered to proceed to North Indo-China. Neither I nor
16 the China Expeditionary Army requested or advised this
17 and we had no control over it or responsibility concern-
18 ing it.

19
20 "VI. The period of my being the Commander of
21 the Korean Army (July 7, 1941 - April 8, 1945) and
22 that of my being the Commander of the 7th Area Army
23 (April 8, 1945 - war's end).

24 "(a) I was the Commander of the Korean Army
25 from July 1941 up to April 1945.

"As the Army had been organized on peacetime

1 footing up to February 1945, I was not at all concerned
2 in the promotion of the Pacific War. In other words, I
3 had no operational duties concerning the Pacific War,
4 until the Korean Army was reorganized on a wartime
5 footing as the 17th Area Army, and detailed on the
6 service of protecting Korea on January 1, 1945.

7 "As regards the telegram dated February 28,
8 1942, from the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army to
9 the Vice-Minister of War, requesting the sending of
10 prisoners to Korea, and also the telegram dated March
11 23, 1942 from the Army Commander to the War Minister,
12 reporting on the plan of accommodating the prisoners,
13 they were both dispatched, sent at the request of the
14 Director-General of the Prisoners Information Bureau,
15 according to the report of Major-General TAKAHASHI,
16 Hiroshi, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Korean
17 Army. I have been informed that the purpose was to
18 transport the prisoners from the southern fighting areas
19 to an atmosphere of quietness in the Japan areas. I
20 made it a rule to treat the prisoners fairly, gave them
21 as much in the way of facilities and provisions as
22 possible. I never saw the above-mentioned dispatches,
23 did not know of their being sent and did not order them
24 sent.
25

"(b) I was appointed Commander of the 7th

1 Area Army (in Singapore) on April 8, 1945 and took
2 command of the Army there from April 22nd on. The
3 duty of this Army was to defend its defense area, but
4 before we could open hostilities against the enemy,
5 the war came to an end. Such conditions existed that
6 communications with various quarters were destroyed
7 by the allied forces.

8 "Finally, I state positively that I never
9 became a Supreme War Councillor throughout my career."

10 Yes, Mr. Naito.

11 MR. NAITO: I desire to ask General ITAGAKI
12 a few questions, if I may.

13 Q General, during the course of this trial you
14 have heard the testimony in which the so-called March
15 Incident and October Incident were mentioned. Did you
16 have any connection with either of those matters?

17 A I had absolutely no connection.

18 Q Did you have any connection with an organ-
19 ization called the Sakura-Kai?

20 A I did not know even about the existence of
21 such an organization. Of course, I had no connection.

22 Q Were you acquainted with Dr. SEAWA?

23 A I knew him.

24 Q Did you have any meeting or conversation
25 with him prior to the 18th of September, 1931, as

1 THE PRESIDENT: Did Hankow fall in 1937
2 as stated at the top of page 33?

3 MR. MATTICE: I will check on it.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, there is no hurry
5 about it.

6 MR. MATTICE: They are making certain about
7 that; I am unable to answer the question.

8 I am informed that the correct date is 1938.

9 THE PRESIDENT: 1938.

10 Yes, Mr. Mattice.

11 MR. MATTICE: I desire to ask General ITAGAKI
12 a few questions, if I may.

13 Q General, during the course of this trial you
14 have heard the testimony in which the so-called March
15 Incident and October Incident were mentioned. Did you
16 have any connection with either of those matters?

17 A I had absolutely no connection.

18 Q Did you have any connection with an organ-
19 ization called the Sakura-Kai?

20 A I did not know even about the existence of
21 such an organization. Of course, I had no connection.

22 Q Were you acquainted with Dr. OKAWA?

23 A I knew him.

24 Q Did you have any meeting or conversation
25 with him prior to the 18th of September, 1931, as

testified by a witness, transcript, page 1980?

1 A I had not had any occasion to meet him
2 during a period of five or six years prior to the
3 Incident on September 18, nor have I ever conducted
4 correspondence with him.

5 Q You know General TANAKA, do you not?

6 A Yes, I do.

7 Q You heard General TANAKA testify in this
8 trial, which testimony appears in transcript, page
9 1985, that he had a meeting and a talk with you at
10 Mukden about June, 1930?

11 A I did not meet with General TANAKA nor have
12 I had any conversation with him regarding the Incident--
13 the Manchurian Incident.

14 Q Do you know of a place called Ryojun? It
15 is spelled in Romanji, R-y-o-j-u-n.

16 I now learn that it refers to a place
17 known as Port Arthur.

18 A Yes, I know the place well.

19 Q Did you have a meeting and talk with
20 General TANAKA at that place about June, 1930?

21 A No, I have not met him nor had any talk
22 with him.

23 Q Now, General, you heard the testimony given
24 here by General TANAKA, which appears in the transcript
25

1 beginning on page 1985, on July 5, 1946, in which
2 General TANAKA said that he had a conversation with
3 you in which you said this, or this in substance:
4 That the situation between China and Japan in
5 Manchuria at that time was extremely aggravated in
6 view of the fact that many pending issues between
7 the two countries, treaty problems and others, had
8 been unsolved. However, after the death of Chang
9 Tso-lin, the relationship between China and Japan
10 became even more seriously aggravated. Furthermore,
11 that the pending questions in Manchuria between the
12 two countries were so serious that their settlement
13 could not be arrived at by diplomatic means; that
14 there was no alternative in solving these problems
15 except the use of armed force; that armed force
16 should be resorted to in Manchuria in order to
17 drive out Chang Hsueh-liang; and, after driving the
18 war lords out, to establish in Manchuria Chinese-
19 Japanese cooperation by literally joining the hands
20 of the two peoples and thereby endeavoring to create
21 a model state under the rule of law and order in
22 accordance with the principles of the kingly way.
23 Did you make any such statement to General TANAKA
24 or anyone else?
25

A First of all, I was not in Port Arthur.

1 I was on one month's trip during the month of June
2 in Tsingtao, Peiping and Tientsin. Secondly, the
3 opinion of the Kwantung Army headquarters, including
4 myself, was that in spite of the existence of anti-
5 Japanese movements and conditions in Manchuria, we
6 must, above all, at all times uphold the policy of
7 bringing about a settlement of the pending issues by
8 all means but that armed clashes must in all events
9 be avoided. For instance, to cite one example, the
10 case of NAKAMURA, Shintaro. This Incident caused a
11 very serious shock to the army but even in this case
12 the settlement of the Incident was sought through
13 diplomatic means. This alone should be proof enough
14 that I could not have made such a statement one year
15 and three months previously.

16 Q General, I will ask you if you made this
17 statement to General TANAKA which appears in the
18 transcript at page 1987 during the testimony of
19 General TANAKA on July 5, 1946--

20 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Mattice, according to
21 the transcript at page 1984, TANAKA said that he met
22 ITAGAKI at Port Arthur in June, 1931, three months
23 before the Mukden Incident.

24 Q General, tell this Tribunal whether you had
25 any meeting with or conversation with General TANAKA

1 at Port Arthur or any other place in June of 1930,
2 or June of 1931, or any other time?

3 A No.

4 MR. MATTICE: If the Tribunal please, I am
5 informed that in reading the paragraph under "V,"
6 page 42, which states that "evacuation of Japanese
7 forces from the whole Chinese territory," by inad-
8 vertence I read that, "evacuating the Chinese forces."
9 It reads--

10 THE PRESIDENT: I am sure the transcript
11 will have it right.

12 MR. MATTICE: I was not certain that the
13 reporter had so recorded it.

14 Now, if the Tribunal please, with respect
15 to the date mentioned by your Honor, I am informed
16 that the Japanese copy reads 1930, June 1930; the
17 English copy reads 1931, and I assume it makes no
18 difference because I have had the witness cover the
19 entire period.

20 THE PRESIDENT: No, in view of his answers
21 it makes no difference but we refer the matter to the
22 language section.

23 MR. MATTICE: That concludes the direct
24 examination. I understand other counsel desire to
25 conduct some examination of this witness.

1 MR. KATO: I am Counsel KATO. I have two
2 additional questions to ask the witness in the
3 direct examination.

4 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

5 BY MR. KATO:

6 Q At the end of October in 1931 when HONJO
7 was Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, did
8 DOHIHARA go to meet Pu-Yi? Under the orders of
9 HONJO did he go to meet Pu-Yi at Tientsin?

10 A Yes.

11 Q At that time was the witness a senior staff
12 officer of the Kwantung Army?

13 A Yes.

14 Q According to prosecution evidence, court
15 exhibit 300, it is alleged that DOHIHARA at that time
16 went to Tientsin and spent 50,000 yuan for the purpose of
17 bribing the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps and plain-
18 clothes men, and so forth, and it is also written
19 that he handed over to the plain-clothes men arms
20 which had been transported by the Kwantung Army. Did
21 the Kwantung Army ever send money or arms to DOHIHARA
22 for such a purpose?

23 A Absolutely none as far as my own knowledge
24 of this matter is concerned.

25 Q One more point. The next point is: When the

1 witness was Army Minister in the KONOYE Cabinet at
2 that time, in July of 1938, was a general peace with
3 China planned through Tang Shao-i and Wu Pei-fu?

4 A Yes, it is exactly as I have set forth in
5 my affidavit.

6 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
7 minutes.

8 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
9 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings
10 were resumed as follows:)

11 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
12 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, counselor.

14 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

15 BY MR. KATO:

16 Q Is it true that in the same year, that is,
17 1938, in the month of November -- is it a fact that
18 in the same year, that is, 1938, in the month of
19 November, the peace efforts came to a dead stop be-
20 cause of the assassination of Tang Shao-i?

21 A Yes --

22 THE PRESIDENT: You cannot ask him to repeat
23 what is in the affidavit.

24 A (Continuing) I think that was in
25 December.

1 Q Do you know that DOHIHARA after that incident
2 tried hard to further the peace movement until the
3 next year of March, next year of 1939; that is, until
4 March of the next year, 1939, that he kept on trying
5 very hard to further the peace movement?

6 A Yes, I know that very well.

7 Q Do you know that in spite of all that that
8 DOHIHARA could not succeed with his efforts, and that
9 at the end of March of that year he returned to Tokyo?

10 A That is my understanding.

11 THE PRESIDENT: This witness has given no
12 evidence against DOHIHARA, and at least a question
13 arises as to whether you should be able to cross-
14 examine him in those circumstances.

15 Q In March of that year did DOHIHARA take the
16 post of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Armies
17 in Manchuria -- the Fifth Army in Manchuria?

18 A Yes.

19 MR. KATO: That is all.

20 MR. HOZUMI: I would like to make a direct
21 examination in behalf of the accused KIDO.

22 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

23 BY MR. HOZUMI:

24 Q General, shortly after you were appointed to
25 the Minister of War of the KONOYE Cabinet, did you call

Marquis KIDO, the Minister of Welfare, at his private residence on June 18, 1938?

1 A Yes, I have recollection of having made the
2 visit about that time.

3 Q Did you dine with him and have a free ex-
4 change of views?

5 A Yes.

6 Q What was the subject of the conversation?

7 A The general subject of the conversation evolved
8 around the subject, the point how to effect a speedy
9 settlement of the China Incident.

10 Q Do you recall what Marquis KIDO told you
11 about the China Incident?

12 A I heard from him the explanation that the
13 recent reorganization of the KONOYE Cabinet was under-
14 taken for the purpose -- undertaken with the aim of
15 bringing about a prompt settlement of the China Incident.
16 Marquis KIDO's personal opinion was that the China
17 Incident must be speedily settled.

18 Q Did you or did you not agree with Marquis
19 KIDO?
20

21 A Naturally, I agreed with him.

22 Q Were you present at the cabinet meeting
23 held on August 2, 1938, when the government policy was
24 discussed with regard to the Changkufeng Incident?
25

1 A Yes.

2 Q Was the Welfare Minister KIDO also present
3 at this same cabinet meeting?

4 A Yes, he was present.

5 Q What was decided at that cabinet meeting?

6 A On the previous day, that is, I think that
7 was August 1, USSR aircraft attacked deep into Korean
8 territory simultaneously with attacks from the ground,
9 causing us to entertain very serious doubts as to
10 whether or not Russia had positive intentions in con-
11 nection with the affair. Generally, two points were
12 decided at that cabinet meeting. The first point was
13 localization of the incident and speedy local settle-
14 ment of the issue; that is, nonexpansion and aggravation
15 of the incident and local settlement of the incident
16 on the spot. The second point of the policy decided
17 was to transfer the matter to diplomatic negotiations
18 with a view to effecting a speedy settlement of the
19 incident, and the army attitude thereon was that it
20 would make every effort to effect a local settlement
21 of the issue even though Japan may have to withdraw
22 from the line which the USSR claimed to be the frontier
23 in the vicinity of Changkufeng.

24 Q Did Marquis KIDO agree with the cabinet decision?
25

 A Yes.

1 MR. HOZUMI: That concludes my examination,
2 your Honor.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Warren. For whom?
4 HIRANUMA, I suppose.

5 MR. WARREN: Oh, for HIRANUMA.

6 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

7 BY MR. WARREN:

8 Q General ITAGAKI, at the time of the forma-
9 tion of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, in January, 1939, is
10 it not true that Baron HIRANUMA asked you to remain
11 in the cabinet as Minister of War?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Now, prior to your acceptance of the post
14 did you have a conversation with Baron HIRANUMA?

15 A I think it was during the morning of Janu-
16 ary 5 a messenger came from the cabinet formation
17 headquarters, that is to say, from Baron HIRANUMA,
18 asking me to come there, so I went.

19 On that occasion Baron HIRANUMA told me
20 that in connection with his being granted the Imper-
21 ial command to form a new cabinet the principle task
22 which would be before the new cabinet would be to
23 effect a speedy settlement of the China Incident.
24 Baron HIRANUMA continued to say that this plan, that
25 is, the plan to effect the speedy settlement of the

1 China Incident, was also the policy of the previous
2 cabinet and therefore that the new cabinet was merely
3 continuing that fixed policy; and he furthermore said
4 that inasmuch as I, the War Minister in the previous
5 cabinet, was being asked to remain in the same post in
6 the new cabinet, he emphatically stated that the reten-
7 tion of the office was an important matter in connection
8 with the handling of the settlement of the China Inci-
9 dent.

10 Q Now, as a condition precedent to your accept-
11 ing the position of Minister of War, did you set out a
12 7-point program which you demanded that HIRANUMA follow
13 or adhere to?

14 A I think that point would be cleared up if I am
15 permitted to continue my reply on the last question.

16 Q Very well.

17 A I shall continue. As far as I was concerned,
18 I understood what the intentions and aims of the new
19 Prime Minister were, but since I could not accept the
20 invitation to remain in office on my own, I told him I
21 will have to return at once and consult -- bring up this
22 matter for discussion at the three army chiefs confer-
23 ence.
24

25 In this connection I said there was one point
of doubt, and just to make sure I posed this question to

1 Baron HIRANUMA, whether he had heard from the previous
2 Prime Minister, Prince KONOYE, anything with regard to
3 the strengthening of the Tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact.
4 To my question Baron HIRANUMA replied that he had heard
5 nothing of the question as yet, but that he would like
6 to properly and wisely dispose of the question after the
7 formation of the cabinet.

8 Thus I concluded my conversation with Baron
9 HIRANUMA, called together the three chiefs conference,
10 and made the report of what had transpired. At the
11 conference of the three chiefs of the army it was con-
12 cluded that the position and intentions of the new Prime
13 Minister were abundantly clear, and I was induced to
14 accept the offer to remain in office as War Minister.

15 Following the decision of the three chiefs
16 conference I entrusted the Vice Minister of War, YAMAWAKI
17 to serve as my messenger to go to the cabinet formation
18 headquarters to notify Baron HIRANUMA of my acceptance
19 of the request to stay in office.

20 That I have just narrated constitutes all of
21 my conversation with Baron HIRANUMA on this matter.

22 Q Then, General ITAGAKI, may we assume from your
23 answer that you did not name any conditions to Baron
24 HIRANUMA that must be promised to be fulfilled before
25 you accepted the position?

1 A What I have narrated to you constitutes every-
2 thing.

3 Q Now, with reference to the witness YAMAWAKI,
4 your former Vice War Minister, he testified Monday, in
5 substance, that he handed to the headquarters for the
6 formation of the HIRANUMA Cabinet a paper as to which the
7 prosecution asked him if it did not contain seven condi-
8 tions for your acceptance. Do you know anything of such
9 a paper?

10 A I don't know anything about that.

11 MR. SHIMANOUCHI: I am Counsel SHIMANOUCHI.
12 I would like to ask two or three questions for defendant
13 OSHIMA.

14 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

15 BY MR. SHIMANOUCHI:

16 Q With regard to the negotiations for the Japan-
17 ese, German, Italian Tripartite Alliance, did you ever
18 send a message to OSHIMA -- a telegram to OSHIMA in Ber-
19 lin?

20 A From the standpoint of the organization or
21 system of our government, or actually speaking, I could
22 not possibly do such a thing.

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1 Q Actually, did you ever send a telegram to him
2 or did you not?

3 A No, I have never sent a telegram.

4 Q According to court exhibit 2230, a German
5 document -- a document of the German side, dated
6 October 28 -- May 28, 1939, says that the War Minister
7 sent OSHIMA a telegram to the following effect:

8 MR. SASAGAWA: If the Tribunal pleases, I
9 heard from the interpreter "alliance" -- the word
10 "alliance" mentioned, but from what I understand, the
11 word "negotiation" should be translated.

12 THE PRESIDENT: We have a Language Board
13 listening to all the interpreter is saying, and we
14 have a monitor. If every Japanese in court claims the
15 right to get up and correct them, we will have nothing
16 but disorder. You have no right to interfere.

17 If you wish, you may approach the Language
18 Section direct, but so as not to interfere with the
19 proper discharge of their duties.

20 Q My first question said that -- was with regard
21 to negotiations for a Japanese-German-Italian Treaty.
22 I shall continue my question. The War Minister sent a
23 telegram to OSHIMA to the following effect: It is
24 claimed in this document that the War Minister sent a
25 telegraphic message to Ambassador OSHIMA asking him to

restrain the actions of ARITA.

1 THE INTERPRETER: There will be a retrans-
2 lation of the counsel's statement: According to this
3 document, the War Minister is alleged to have wired
4 Ambassador OSHIMA in Berlin to the effect that he
5 would like to have OSHIMA refrain from taking any
6 actions or working on ARITA.

7 Q (Continuing) The Army is of the determination
8 to fight through at the cost of the fall of the Cabi-
9 net.

10 Did you ever send a telegram to this effect
11 to OSHIMA or did you not?
12

13 A I have never sent him a telegram.

14 MR. SHIMANOCHI: That is all.

15 MR. MATTICE: The prosecution may cross-examine.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Judge Nyi.

17 CROSS-EXAMINATION

18 BY JUDGE NYI:

19 Q Mr. ITAGAKI, on page 10 of your affidavit,
20 you refer to a statement made public by General HONJO
21 in October, 1931. Was this statement in writing?

22 A No.

23 Q Did you remember -- memorize every word of
24 his statement?

25 A Yes. That statement was given by way of

1 explanation from General HONJO many, many times re-
2 peatedly. But, it appeared that General HONJO had a
3 memo, but of that I do not know.

4 JUDGE NYI: Your Honor, in view of the fact
5 that the accused said that this statement was not in
6 writing, we withdraw our objection.

7 Q You admitted that the Kwantung Army had
8 mapped out an operational plan before the outbreak of
9 the Mukden Incident. Did you take part in drafting
10 this plan?

11 A It appears that it would be necessary for me
12 to explain what an operational plan is.

13 Q I don't want your explanation. You seem to
14 have an explanation already in your affidavit. Now,
15 I want to ask you whether you participated in the
16 drafting, yes or no.

17 A The operational plan is drawn up by the
18 officers in charge of operations in accordance with
19 instructions, orders, and directions from the General
20 Headquarters, issued, that is, by his superiors in that
21 department. Now, I had no direct connection with draw-
22 ing up this operational plan.

23 Q You say, the Supreme Command. Is that the
24 Supreme Command in Tokyo?

25 A It is customary and it is a common practice

1 in all nations for annual operational plans to be
2 drawn up by the General Staff Headquarters where it
3 is determined --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Correction, please, to the
5 latter part: It is customary and it is a common
6 practice in all nations for operational plans to be
7 drafted in accordance with instructions from the
8 General Staff Headquarters, where this draft is sub-
9 mitted for determination, annually.

10 Q But, you stated in your affidavit that you
11 drafted this plan without getting assistance from the
12 Central Authorities, and now you stated that you have
13 drafted it with the direction of the Central Author-
14 ities. Do you see if there is an inconsistency?

15 A I think you will understand the matter clear-
16 ly if you carefully read my affidavit, but I shall
17 briefly explain. If you read a little while -- some
18 paragraphs previous to what I think you have read in
19 my affidavit, you will understand what I really mean.
20 The Kwantung Army requested of the Central Authorities,
21 as its desire, for an increase in troop strength, or
22 such things as an increase in troop strength, the
23 granting of newer and more modern weapons, or to
24 change the disposition of the forces so as to meet
25 with actual conditions on the spot. But, in spite of

1 this expression of the Kwantung Army's desire, the
2 Central Authorities did not take these requests up,
3 and the proper interpretation and understanding of my
4 affidavit is this: And so the Kwantung Army, on its
5 part, had no alternative but to draw up a plan in
6 accordance with the troops, equipment, and material
7 that it had available and had in its own hands.

1 Q Now, don't explain further. My question will
2 be: This plan was reported and approved by the Central
3 Authorities in Tokyo; is that correct?

4 A Yes.

5 Q What was the nature of the Kokusui-Kai? Was
6 it a secret society like the Black Dragon Society?

7 A Did you say Kokusui? Will you repeat it.

8 Q Kokusui-Kai.

9 A Not being well informed, I don't know of the
10 existence of such a society.

11 Q "Koku" means the nation, "sui" means the essence;
12 National Essence Society.

13 A Such an organization might have existed, but
14 I do not know anything about it.

15 Q You have been reported that you were closely
16 associated with the members therewith before the out-
17 break of the Mukden Incident. Did not the consular
18 authorities in Mukden ever take steps to disassociate
19 you or even to check your activities in association
20 with members of the Kokusui Society?

21 A Since you are putting a very strange question
22 to me, I am hard put to make a reply because I have
23 never heard of a Kokusui-Kai and therefore I know
24 nothing about it.

25 Q To refresh your mind I will read to you

1 a portion from Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA's telegram
2 to Consul-General HAYASHI:

3 "We have heard that Colonel ITAGAKI and others
4 of the Kwantung Army at your place are exerting them-
5 selves in various activities recently with considerably
6 ample funds and are manipulating Japanese adventurers
7 in China and members of the 'Kokusui-Kai'." Continuing:
8 "and that in view of the tardy progress of the
9 negotiation regarding the NAKAMURA Incident, especially,
10 they have decided on some concrete move around the
11 middle of this month." In conclusion he states:
12 "...please take further deliberate steps for controlling
13 the activities of the Ronin and the like."

14 This telegram was dated the 5th of September
15 1931. Does that help your memory?

16 A I have no knowledge as to the contents of the
17 telegram just read by you, but in connection with some
18 of the subject referred to therein I have some knowledge.
19 The contents --

20 THE INTERPRETER: Correction: The contents
21 in that telegram are groundless, but in connection with
22 the subject matter brought up I have some knowledge.

23 A (Continuing) I don't remember when, but I
24 think it was after the Manchurian Incident that Major
25 General MIYAKE, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army,

1 put a telegram before me and told me to read it. In
2 connection with this, Major General MIYAKE, Chief of
3 Staff, explained that he could not quite withhold his
4 indignation over the matter and went to the Consul-
5 General and cast some very sarcastic jokes about it,
6 whereupon, the Consul-General, somewhat embarrassed,
7 went on scratching his head.

8 But with regard to such groundless contentions
9 as to the fact that I had ample funds or had manipulated
10 adventurers, if you wish I should be very glad to make
11 a lengthy explanation.

12 Q Before you make an explanation --

13 THE MONITOR: Just a moment, please. The
14 answer previous to that should be "Chief of Staff, Major
15 General MIYAKE, felt that it was ridiculous, but..."
16 and so forth.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Does it require a lengthy
18 explanation to disclaim your association with such
19 people?

20 THE WITNESS: Well, there are absolutely no
21 facts to prove that there were ample funds or anything
22 which would show any connection of myself with the
23 Kokusui-Kai. I am a poor man and I have always been a
24 poor man and have never had any money, and as for the
25 Kwantung Army --

1 Q Just a few minutes ago you answered me that
2 you have never heard of such a society as the Kokusui
3 Society. Now, later you stated that you were shown a
4 telegram by the Consul-General. Now, was it a fact
5 that you knew what the Kokusui Society was for?

6 A I have never said that a Consul-General showed
7 me a telegram.

8 THE PRESIDENT: He said Major General MIYAKE.

9 Q The Chief of Staff MIYAKE.

10 So, did you notice that Kokusui Society in this
11 telegram shown by MIYAKE?

12 A No, I did not notice that particular point, but
13 I do recall some charges or statements that many
14 adventurers were being used.

15 JUDGE NYI: May it please the Tribunal, I
16 ask that the witness be shown this telegram, which was
17 supposed to have been -- the contents of which were
18 supposed to have been shown to him by Chief of Staff
19 MIYAKE.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Show it to him after the
21 luncheon recess. We will recess until half-past one.

22 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

1 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at
2
3 1330.

4
5 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
6 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

7 THE PRESIDENT: With the Tribunal's permis-
8 sion, the accused OKA will be absent from the court-
9 room for the whole of the afternoon conferring with
10 his counsel.

11 Captain Kraft.

12 LANGUAGE ARBITER (Captain Kraft): With the
13 Court's permission, with reference to exhibit No.
14 3316 we submit that the Japanese record, dated 5 July,
15 1946, page 12, and the English transcript of the same
16 date, page 1985, line 7 and 8, show the date to be
17 June, 1930.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Captain Kraft.
19 Judge Nyi.

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1 S E I S H I R O I T A G A K I, an accused, resumed
2 the stand and testified through Japanese inter-
3 preters as follows:

4 CROSS-EXAMINATION

5 BY JUDGE NYI (Continued):

6 Q Mr. ITAGAKI, have you read the contents of
7 this telegram?

8 A Yes, I have read it.

9 Q Does this bear the same contents as the one
10 shown to you by MIYAKE?

11 A This is a different document. Chief of
12 Staff MIYAKE talked with the Consul-General at the
13 Consulate-General, and the talk ended more or less in
14 a big laugh between the two, but MIYAKE asked the
15 Consul-General if he might not be shown the original
16 and make a copy thereof which consisted of two or,
17 perhaps, three pages. And he had those two or three
18 sheets of paper when he talked to me. The Chief of
19 Staff held two or three sheets of paper and said it
20 contained such and such and asked me if I might not
21 look at it. I did, but I do not recall -- I have no
22 recollection whether the contents of what were con-
23 tained in those sheets are what are contained in this
24 document.

25 Q You mean to say that you are not sure whether

1 the contents of these two documents were the same?
2 You don't mean to say that it was an entirely differ-
3 ent document.

4 A I have no recollection whatsoever as to the
5 form of this document nor the contents thereof such
6 as the mention of the name "Kokusui-kai." I have no
7 recollection whatever of saying such a word as
8 "Kokusui-kai."

9 Q Does the other document contain similar con-
10 tents aside from "Kokusui-kai"?

11 A Yes. As I said before, such words as
12 "adventurer" or "ronin" -- that I do remember.

13 JUDGE NYI: If your Honor please, we will
14 tender this evidence at a later stage.

15 Q Mr. ITAGAKI, was it a fact that the carrying
16 out of your plan involved actions of the Japanese
17 garrison at Fushun?

18 A No, entirely different.

19 Q Do you remember that as early as September
20 14 an emergency defense meeting was called at Fushun
21 in anticipation of something to happen?

22 A I should like to call your attention to what
23 has already been explained in this court in connection
24 with the Fushun question. Are you asking me about
25 this?

1 Q Perhaps you will lend me your ear. I asked
2 you whether there was such a meeting called.

3 A Well, I heard of that afterwards.

4 Q How long afterwards?

5 A It was after the outbreak of the incident
6 that I heard of it.

7 Q In connection with General TATEKAWA's arrival
8 from Tokyo, at what hour of the day did he reach Muk-
9 den station?

10 A I have no exact recollection, but I should
11 think it was some time late in the afternoon, around
12 five or six.

13 Q Do you recall what time you arrived at Muk-
14 den from Liaoyang?

15 A Not exact about this either, but I should
16 think it was around two or three o'clock in the after-
17 noon.

18 Q Do you recall what did you do during the
19 period between your arrival and his arrival?

20 A I do not think I had any special thing to
21 do.

22 Q Were you in the Special Service Organ?

23 A I was at a Japanese inn called the Shinyokan.

24 Q Do you remember what kind of clothes did
25 General TATEKAWA wear, whether it was a military

1 uniform or civilian clothes?

2 A Well, I don't know what he wore during his
3 trip; but, when I met him at the Japanese inn, he was
4 attired in a Japanese cotton-padded kimono.

5 Q Civilian clothes, isn't it?

6 A The dotera is not a uniform of any kind. It
7 is just lounging kimono supplied by the inn to relax
8 in.

9 Q Did you know that you had an important mis-
10 sion with him?

11 A Until I had this interview with him, I knew
12 nothing.

13 Q Did you ask him why he was attired in
14 civilian clothes?

15 THE PRESIDENT: Well, there is no point in
16 this, Judge Nyi. You are trying to prove that he
17 went there furtively, I suppose. All you have got so
18 far is that he was wearing the garb supplied by the
19 inn to its customers.

20 Q You say you dined with him. How long a
21 time -- how much time did you spend with him, about
22 a couple of hours?

23 A Yes, I think about that amount of time.

24 Q Was it customary and even compelling that a
25 special emissary like TATEKAWA should deliver his

1 message without the slightest delay, especially in
2 view of the urgent circumstances then existing?

3 A Perhaps so.

4 Q But apparently he did not, did he?

5 A First of all, all I learned from him is
6 what I have already stated in my affidavit. I did
7 not hear from him anything in addition to that in
8 connection with his mission.

9 Q But you did tell him that there was no need
10 for worrying, is that correct? Why did you make an
11 effort to tell him that there was no need for worry-
12 ing?

13 A He addressed a question to me, and so I
14 replied in accordance with my belief.

15 Q Where did he stay that night?

16 A The same inn.

17 Q And on your way to the billet you said you
18 were concerned with the case of NAKAMURA and so you
19 went to the Special Service Organ. You have earlier
20 told TATEKAWA that there was no need for worrying.
21 Why did you again feel concern that night at such
22 late hour so that you feel that you should call on
23 the Special Service Organ? What's the reason?

24 A No, that isn't so. It was only about 8:30
25 o'clock in the evening, so it was still too early to

1 retire; and because I had some time I made a visit.

2 Q Your visit stayed -- continued until about
3 half-past ten or even later.

4 A You mean my visit to the Special Service
5 Organ?

6 Q Exactly.

7 A As I have already written in my affidavit,
8 because there was no new information which had come
9 in, I engaged in an informal chat with the members
10 of the staff of the Special Service Organ; and it
11 was just about the time I was on the point of leav-
12 ing the Special Service Organ for my billet that
13 an urgent message came in from the front line --
14 from a telephone -- an urgent telephone call from
15 the garrison reporting the outbreak of an incident.
16 This prevented me from returning to my billet.

17 Q So this was quite a long chat, was it, two
18 and a half hours and longer?

19 A It couldn't have been as long as that. The
20 time that I called up Special Service Organ was
21 about nine o'clock, so I should say our chat lasted
22 about an hour and a half.

23 Q Was it a rule that any communication with
24 Army Headquarters had to be requested through the
25 Special Service Organ?

1 A That was customary.

2 Q So, the Special Service Organ was an import-
3 ant function and not merely engaging in collecting
4 information and issuing press releases, am I correct?

5 A Seeing that the question related to communi-
6 cations, I'll start my reply by beginning with that.
7 The Special Service Organ had a telegraph -- code
8 telegram form and not everybody having this form;
9 and so, if there was any need to send a coded mili-
10 tary telegram, it was necessary to call up the
11 Special Service Organ. I couldn't quite get your
12 meaning when you said something about a specially
13 important function of the Special Service Organ.

14 Q I was asking you whether the Special Ser-
15 vice Organ was engaged merely in collecting informa-
16 tion and issuing press releases and if there is any
17 more.

18 A I think the functions of the Special Service
19 Organ have already been fully explained to this Tri-
20 bunal. But, whenever any negotiations related to
21 military matters had to be conducted, the import-
22 ant matters were relayed to the Consulate-General,
23 and less important or minor matters were dealt with
24 directly by the Special Service Organ with the Staff
25 Office of the Chinese in Mukden.

Q You still haven't answered my question.
Now let me ask you another one.

THE PRESIDENT: Judge Nyi, there are very many important matters about which this witness may be cross-examined, but there is a limited amount of time to be given to each. You have been a very long time in this issue. There is an immense amount of evidence on the prosecution side about the Mukden issue. Do you want to add to it extensively?

JUDGE NYI: If your Honor please, I want to get a direction from the Tribunal if this is considered by the Court to be cumulative.

THE PRESIDENT: The amount of time that you are spending on this is not warranted by the results you are getting.

JUDGE NYI: We would ask if the Court is interested to hear further evidence about this Mukden Incident, if the Court does not think it is cumulative.

THE PRESIDENT: You are avoiding what I am putting to you. I am telling you, in effect, you are spending a lot of time in trying to get something, but you are getting nothing. It is our duty under the Charter not to waste time on details, and you are not even getting details.

1 JUDGE NYI: With all due respect, I must
2 state that we are only trying to put forth the case,
3 and we are only trying to get in more facts to prove
4 our case. We will certainly --

5 THE PRESIDENT: It is a matter for the ma-
6 jority of the Tribunal to decide whether they have
7 heard enough of this cross-examination on this
8 incident.

9 JUDGE NYI: I would like to get a ruling of
10 the Tribunal on this point.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Proceed to cross-examine
12 as you intended. Every effort of mine to save time
13 here seems to be frustrated.

14 BY JUDGE NYI (Continued):

15 Q Mr. ITAGAKI, was it a fact that, after
16 SHIMAMOTO and HIRATA stated to you that they were
17 ready to fight, you immediately approved that plan?

18 A Yes.

19 Q Did you order either HIRATA or SHIMAMOTO to
20 ascertain the actual situation before carrying on
21 their plan of attack?

22 A I tried to ascertain the situation as much
23 as possible.

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1 Q How?

2 A I heard each and every telephone call that
3 came in from the front at the Special Service Organ.
4 As I have stated in my affidavit, I took every trouble
5 and effort to obtain data upon which I can make a
6 sound judgment of the situation. As it was, it was
7 a sudden unexpected incident. The telephone messages
8 coming in from the front lines were fragmentary and
9 at times were even inconsistent. Try how hard we may
10 to ascertain the true nature of the situation, it
11 was a difficult task because our signal corps was
12 constantly moving and changing their position.
13 Actually it took time to establish contact with
14 them in order to get the details.

15 Q Turning now to the municipal administration
16 in Mukden, was it you who recommended DOHIHARA to be
17 the mayor?

18 A No.

19 Q Was he appointed by General HONJO?

20 A The appointment was made by General HONJO.

21 Q Do you recall that MORISHIMA advised you
22 against the setting up of the municipal administra-
23 tion?
24

25 A No, it was the Chief of Staff who called
Consul MORISHIMA and I was just present at the meeting

1 with the commandant of the Kempeitai and perhaps
2 others, and so the conference or talks were held
3 between the Chief of Staff and Consul MORISHIMA.

4 Q And you were present, were you?

5 A Yes, as I said before.

6 Q But you did not accept this position, did
7 you?

8 A Consul MORISHIMA did not present to me
9 anything that would require my acceptance.

10 Q But did he express an idea against the
11 setting up of the municipal administration and did
12 he not get any results?

13 A Consul MORISHIMA, putting a question to the
14 Chief of Staff, asked whether a military administration
15 was going to be established. To this question the
16 Chief of Staff replied no, no military administration
17 was contemplated. Such an exchange of question and
18 answer took place. Other than that I have no recol-
19 lection as to what transpired.

20 Q Did Consul-General HAYASHI call on General
21 HONJO in person to point out that it was a mistake
22 to set up a municipal administration?

23 A Well, I have not directly heard anything
24 from General HONJO but what I heard from the Chief of
25 Staff was similar to what was said at the conversation

1 between the Chief of Staff and Consul MORISHIMA.

2 Q Do you know what General HONJO replied to
3 the Consul-General?

4 A As I said before, my recollection is that
5 General HONJO on his part stated that no military
6 administration was being established and that the
7 Consul-General, understanding the position held by
8 the Kwantung Army, returned. That is all.

9 Q Did not the Commander tell to the Consul-
10 General that on the whole he agreed with the Consul-
11 General but inasmuch as the order had already been
12 given he had no way to alter it?

13 A No, that is not so. What I heard was as
14 I have already testified.

15 Q You stated in your affidavit that there
16 were only a few Japanese advisers and a greater part
17 of the functionaries were Chinese nationals. Do you
18 know who was Chief of the General Affairs Section?

19 A I do not know.

20 Q Was not his name IORIYA, Makoto?

21 THE INTERPRETER: Will you give us the
22 spelling of the surname?

23 JUDGE NYI: I-O-R-I-Y-A; that is the surname.

24 A Well, a person by the name of IORIYA was the
25 president of the Japanese Residents' Association and

1 he was one of several Japanese members, and to that
2 extent I have a recollection but I have no knowledge
3 whether he had taken such an office.

4 Q Are you familiar with the personnel --
5 familiar with the chiefs of the sections in this
6 municipal administration?

7 A Are you referring to the municipal adminis-
8 tration?

9 Q Yes.

10 A As I said before, I do remember that
11 several Japanese entered the municipal administration
12 and worked there, but as to whether they held the
13 position of chief of any section or department or
14 anything of that nature, there is nothing in my
15 recollection.

16 Q How could you be so certain to say that
17 they only served as advisers?

18 A Well, I didn't fully comprehend your question,
19 but responsible Chinese who could hold positions of
20 some responsibility and leadership had hidden or had
21 escaped -- I don't know which term would be the better
22 term to use -- and they were not around. If they had
23 been around there was no need for Japanese helping
24 set up their administration.

25 Q I do not want your speech. I want to know--

1 you stated that Japanese only served as advisers and
2 now I want to know whether you were familiar with the
3 names of the chiefs of sections of the municipal
4 administration. You have already answered yes and
5 now let me ask you who was Chief of the Police Affairs
6 Section?

7 A The mayor used this person as an assistant,
8 but how he used him I do not know. Slight addition:
9 How the mayor used this assistant, a Japanese, I do
10 not know.

11 Q Was the Chief of Police Affairs Section
12 TSURUOKA, Eitaro, and was not the name of the Chief
13 of Financial Affairs Section MITANI, Suejiro; was not
14 the name of the Chief of Sanitary Affairs Section
15 MORITA, Fukumatsu; was not the name of the mayor's
16 secretary TOMIMURA, Junichi; was the name of the
17 Chief of the Technical Section and of the Enterprise
18 Section YOSHIKAWA, Yasushi? Do they consist of the
19 key personnel of the municipal administration?
20

21 A As I have said repeatedly, there were no
22 Chinese, responsible Chinese, around to undertake the
23 task of municipal administration and therefore, there
24 being no alternative, the Japanese took over that
25 responsibility for the time being; but as to your
question as to what Japanese occupied the position of

1 chief of which section, I did not reply yes to your
2 question. You said that I knew the names but my
3 reply to your question was that I did not know.
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1 Q Previously I asked you whether you were
2 familiar with the personnel of the chiefs of the
3 sections in the municipal administration, and your
4 answer was definitely, yes.

5 A Well, I actually do not know the names of
6 those people so I have consistently and repeatedly
7 replied that I do not know. If I replied otherwise
8 there might be some kind of a misunderstanding. How
9 can I say I know them when I don't?

10 Q You do know the name of IORIYA, don't you?

11 A Yes, very well.

12 Q And all the other names which I have just
13 mentioned, they are Japanese, aren't they?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Now, do you know, Mr. ITAGAKI, that in order
16 to raise funds the Municipal Administration under
17 DOHIHARA had planned the monopoly of opium and the
18 issuance of lottery tickets?

19 A No, I do not know.

20 Q Did you know that the Kwantung Army Headquarters
21 had no objection but instructed the municipal administra-
22 tion to make clear stipulations and to get the approval
23 of the headquarters for this before the plans were
24 put in operation?

25 A No, I do not remember.

1 Q To refresh your mind, let me read to you a
2 telegram from Consul-General HAYASHI in Mukden to
3 Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, dated 13 October 1931.
4 It reads as follows:

5 "According to reliable sources we are
6 notified that the municipal administrative office
7 has planned a monopolization of opium and the issue of
8 lottery tickets for the purpose of raising their funds,
9 and has asked the headquarters of the army for their
10 approval. We are also informed that though the
11 headquarters of the army had no objections to the
12 plan they instructed the office to state the stipu-
13 lations clearly and to get approval of the headquarters
14 before the plans are put in operation, and also to
15 report the stipulations to the Consulate and to the
16 police station. Not only are the monopolization of
17 opium and the issuing of lottery tickets naturally
18 unfavorable from the viewpoint of international
19 relations, and so forth, in general, but they are the
20 materialization of a part of the plans of the army
21 marked Secret 781 of October 2. Therefore regarding
22 this matter we ask you to call upon the top army to
23 immediately check this movement and in consideration
24 of the delicate situation kindly take special care to
25 preserve absolute secrecy from army as to the receipt

1 of this telegram and the contents of the above
2 mentioned official letter."

3 Is that clear, that both the army and the
4 consulate had been approached on that subject? Does
5 that help you to recollect?

6 A There is something about "approach", or some-
7 thing of that nature, at the end of the question. May
8 I have it repeated? I could not comprehend it fully.

9 (Whereupon, a portion of the last
10 question was repeated by the Japanese court
11 reporter.)

12 A Well, I have never been approached.

13 Q Do you remember that the army had been
14 approached?

15 A I do not know.

16 Q Do you know that DOHIHARA was guiding the local
17 Peace Preservation Committee in Mukden?

18 A The mayor handled only affairs relating to
19 the city.

20 Q Was he also taking charge of the Special
21 Service Organ?

22 A It is a fact that Colonel DOHIFARA was the
23 chief of the Special Service Organ up to the outbreak
24 of the Incident. However, there were no headquarters
25 of the army there. That is why the Special Service

1 Organ was necessary. But as soon as Headquarters was
2 moved up to that point, to Mukden, there was no need
3 for any Special Service Organ. It would naturally go
4 out of existence. Therefore DOHHARA was no longer
5 chief of the Special Service Organ, but exclusively
6 a mayor.

7 Q Do you mean to say that the Special Service
8 Organ was abolished after he became mayor?

9 A Yes, natural abolition, automatic abolition.

10 Q Do you recall that General MINAMI has stated
11 to this Court that the abolition of this Special
12 Service did not take effect until 1935?

13 A That is different. That is the relationship;
14 while the Kwantung Army Headquarters continued to exist
15 in Mukden, the Mukden Special Service Organ was abolished.
16 After the establishment of Manchukuo, and I think it was
17 some time after the establishment of that State, the
18 general Kwantung Headquarters of that army were
19 moved up to Changchun, or Hsinking, and there was a
20 short period of time when there was neither a Headquarters
21 nor a Special Service Organ in Mukden; and so, because
22 the necessity for a Special Service Organ in Mukden
23 arose -- in October or November, if I remember correctly,
24 in 1932 -- the Mukden Special Service Organ was revived.
25 Therefore, during the tenure of office of Commanding

1 General MINAMI in Manchuria, there was a Mukden Special
2 Service Organ.

3 Q Now, Mr. ITAGAKI, do you know that DOHIHARA
4 prohibited the setting up of another political regime
5 with the Four Peoples' Preservation Committee as the
6 basis, which was sponsored or was headed by Kan Chao Hsi?
7

8 A Is that something different from the Peace
9 Preservation Corps or Peace Preservation Committee?

10 Q Yes, it is different.

11 A Then I do not know.

12 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
13 minutes.

14 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was
15 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings
16 were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Judge Nyi.

3 BY JUDGE NYI (Continued):

4 Q General ITAGAKI, was it a fact that when the
5 local Peace Preservation Committee issued a declaration
6 on November 5, 1931, the Kwantung Army headquarters
7 ordered the insertion of the following words: "Rela-
8 tions shall be severed with Chang Hsueh-Liang's former
9 regime and the National Government of the Republic of
10 China"?
11

12 A I do not know.

13 Q Do you recall that because of the insistence
14 of the Kwantung Army for the insertion of the above words
15 influential persons like Yuan Ching-Kai and Yu Chung Han
16 were placed in a dilemma?

17 A I do not.

18 Q Was Yuan Ching-Kai one of the central figures
19 in the so-called South Government Guiding Board?
20

21 A I think Yuan Ching-Kai was associated with the
22 Peace Preservation Committee, while Yu Chung-Han was
23 associated with the Self-Government Guiding Board.

24 Q Was it a fact that on October 28 the army
25 called together the garrison commanders and provost marshals of the various areas to support the policy?

1 A That is not a fact.

2 Q Was it on that occasion that Chief of Staff
3 MIYAKE gave instructions that the enforcement of local
4 autonomy and the guidance by Japanese should never be
5 revealed outwardly?

6 A In Japan where?

7 THE INTERPRETER: Will you repeat the ques-
8 tion, please?

9 Q Was it on this occasion that Chief of Staff
10 MIYAKE gave instructions that the enforcement of local
11 autonomy and the guidance by Japanese should never be
12 revealed outwardly?

13 A I don't know about that.

14 Q You mentioned you met Tsang Shih-i. What was
15 he doing after the outbreak of the Mukden Incident?

16 A After the outbreak of the Incident and I think
17 even before the outbreak of the Incident he was confined
18 at his own home because of illness.

19 Q Was it a fact that he was arrested and impris-
20 oned and killed December 15 for refusing to help in the
21 establishment of an independent government?

22 A No, that is not so.

23 Q Was it Yuan Chin-Kai who was approached next
24 for this job?

25 A From the very outset of the establishment of

1 the Peace Preservation Committee the president, or chair-
2 man, was Yuan Chin-Kai.

3 Q Around the middle of November, 1931, was Yuan
4 Chin-Kai also under strict watch by the army because
5 he was complaining to foreigners?

6 A No, there was nothing of the kind.

7 Q Do you mean you didn't know that or that there
8 was never such a thing?

9 A That there was nothing of the kind.

10 Q On page 15 of your affidavit you stated that
11 General Chang Hai-Peng was firm in his decision to sup-
12 port the Emperor Hsuan Tung.

13 A That was Lo Chen-Yu --

14 THE INTERPRETER: The witness went as far as
15 that.

16 Q Was he one of the supporters of Hsuan Tung?

17 A You mean Chang Hai-Peng?

18 Q Yes.

19 A Yes, I learned of it from Lo Chen-Yu.

20 Q Do you know that he received Japanese aid in
21 the form of money and rifles?

22 A No, that is not the case.

23 Q You mentioned the name of Hsieh Chieh-Shih in
24 your affidavit on top of page 15. Do you know that
25 the Japanese Consul General in Mukden was told by Mr.

1 Shih that Chang Hai-Peng would enter Tsitsihar and de-
2 clare the province of Heilungkiang independent on condi-
3 tion of receiving Japanese aid?

4 A I do not have any knowledge as to who told
5 Chang Hai-Peng about the giving of Japanese assistance.

1 Q Did the Japanese participate in the dis-
2 cussion about the form of government that the new
3 state was going to take?

4 A Are you referring to the Northeastern
5 Administrative Council meeting in the middle of
6 February?

7 Q At any time did the Japanese participate in
8 the discussion about what form of government the new
9 state was going to take?

10 A There was in no case participation in such
11 discussions.

12 Q Did you hear day before yesterday the read-
13 ing of the paper, exhibit 3296-A, in which was de-
14 scribed a discussion meeting held in Yamato Hotel in
15 Mukden on January 11, 1932, and in that meeting,
16 attended by both Japanese and Chinese notables, they
17 discussed the form of government to be established in
18 Manchuria?

19 A Is that a question?

20 Q Yes, it is.

21 A That was a meeting sponsored by a Japanese
22 newspaper. It was a purely unofficial or informal
23 gathering and had no responsibility whatsoever of
24 any kind.

25 Q Was it attended by members of the Kwantung

1 Army?

2 A I understand that some members participated
3 in the meeting, attended the meeting. Correction:
4 I understand that it is represented that Kwantung
5 Army members attended the meeting, but they attended
6 purely in their private capacity, and they had no
7 official responsibility of any kind by attending this
8 so-called round-table discussion.

9 Q During your interviews with the political
10 leaders of the various districts did you come across
11 any one who dared oppose the independence movement?

12 A The situation is as I have described in my
13 affidavit.

14 Q You stated that they agreed with you unani-
15 mously. Was that pointed to those persons who were
16 approached by you, not including the people whom you
17 have not approached?

18 A These were people who had possession of actual
19 authority, such as chiefs of provinces and commanders
20 of army troops. They were all men who had responsi-
21 bility toward the people, the inhabitants of the
22 country; and as for the Kwantung Army headquarters,
23 it was most necessary, in the performance of their
24 duty, to preserve law and order, to understand and
25 fully appreciate the desires of these people of

1 responsibility.

2 Q So you mean to say that they derived their
3 authority and responsibility from the Kwantung Army?

4 A That is not the case at all. I am speaking
5 of the masters of the people living on the soil.

6 Q And the soil was occupied by Japanese troops;
7 was that correct?

8 A The Japanese Army has never occupied that
9 territory.

10 Q Now, with regard to Henry Pu-Yi, was it
11 you who sent DOHIHARA down to Tientsin in October-
12 November, 1931?

13 A The Commanding General of the Kwantung Army.

14 Q Was it a fact that the details of the meet-
15 ing with Pu-Yi were arranged by you?

16 A You mean my meeting with Mr. Pu-Yi?

17 Q DOHIHARA's meeting.

18 A Colonel DOHIHARA was dispatched to Tientsin
19 by order of Commanding General HONJO.

20 Q Did you hear the reading of DOHIHARA's
21 interrogations in which he stated that details of the
22 meeting with Pu-Yi were arranged by you? Exhibit
23 2191, appearing on record, 15727.

24 THE PRESIDENT: What exhibit number did you
25 give then?

1 JUDGE NYI: 2190.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is correct.
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1 Q Did you hear that?

2 A Yes, I understand it in its general outline.
3 Of course, with respect to Colonel DOHIHARA's trips
4 such as matters of traveling expenses, I looked after
5 that.

6 Q Why was he preferred and given this assignment?

7 A As already shown by defense exhibits DOHIHARA's
8 principal assignment was to collect information and
9 intelligence in the Tientsin area -- in the Tientsin-
10 Peiping area.

11 Q I am asking you was DOHIHARA --

12 A On the other hand, DOHIHARA's burdens were
13 considerably lightened at that time because there were
14 fine, responsible persons to whom he could entrust much
15 of his principal tasks.

16 THE MONITOR: At that time the position of the
17 Mayor, which DOHIHARA had held previously, was delegated
18 to a fine, responsible Chinese who took over his job,
19 and thereby relieving DOHIHARA of much of his busy tasks
20 and consequently DOHIHARA was comparatively speaking,
21 a free man. Further, he was especially considered the
22 most suitable man to perform this assignment because
23 his main task related to collection of intelligence or
24 information.

25 Q Was it not a fact that before DOHIHARA was sent,

52
a certain UEZUMI had been sent to Tientsin to contact
Battalion Commander SAKAI for the purpose of taking
Pu-Yi to Yinkow? 22

A Who is this person you called UEZUMI; a 12
military officer? 02

Q Are you familiar with the name? 61

A Among army officers I do not recall such a 81
name. 21

Q Are you familiar with the name SAKAI? 91

A Well, there are many persons with that name
SAKAI in the army, but I do not know or recall whether
or not a person by that name was in Tientsin at that
time. 21

Q Was it not because the previous plan had not
materialized and you found it necessary to dispatch a
man like DOHIHARA to enlarge on this project? 6

A In the first place, I do not know anything
about what you called previously or previous plan,
and secondly, I am totally unfamiliar with what you
call a project. 5

Q Didn't you admit that the details were arranged
by you as stated by DOHIHARA in his interrogatory? 6

A What I have said previously was that inasmuch
as DOHIHARA's going to Tientsin would require some
traveling expenses I looked after that and other minor 1

1 details, but other than that I do not know what you
2 are referring to when you say about other arrangements
3 because I know nothing of them. Beyond what I have
4 stated, I do not know anything.

5 Q You only arranged for the finances, expenses.
6 Are you the Treasurer of the Kwantung Army?

7 A No. In looking after these details as to
8 DOHIHARA's trip, I gave the orders to the intendance
9 officer to provide necessary traveling expenses for a
10 tour which was scheduled for about a one month duration
11 and also sufficient money -- money sufficient to employ
12 perhaps one assistant which DOHIHARA might need.

13 Q And nothing more than that?

14 A That is what I mean.

15 Q Who was the other man? What was the man called
16 by the name of OTANI, Takeshi?

17 A That, I do not know. He was perfectly free to
18 take his assistant from Mukden or to employ this
19 assistant after he arrived in Tientsin.

20 Q Do you know that a third man had joined them
21 from Dairen by the name of KUDO, Tetsusaburo? Would
22 that affect the finances over which you seemed to take
23 charge?

24 THE MONITOR: Would you repeat that question,
25 please?

1 Q Would that affect the finances over which
2 you seemed to take charge?

3 A I have no supervision over finances.

4 Q Didn't you say that you ordered this officer in
5 charge of the funds to give them money sufficient
6 for two men and for about a period of about a month?

7 A Yes.

8 Q So you didn't know what DOHIHARA was going
9 down to Tientsin, didn't you?

10 THE INTERPRETER: Do you mean going down to
11 Tientsin for what?

12 JUDGE NYI: Yes, what his business was.

13 A As I have been saying for the past number of
14 minutes, DOHIHARA was given this assignment by Commanding
15 General HONJO and left on this assignment. I know that.
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1 Q For what?

2 A First of all, to collect information and
3 intelligence relative to the Tientsin-Peiping area.
4 Secondly, there was some troops of Chang Hsueh-liang
5 still left north of the Great Wall, and it was highly
6 necessary, in order to avoid any possible clashes
7 between the Japanese and the Chinese, to ascertain
8 the true situation existing in that area, inasmuch as
9 there was a possibility, unless precautions were taken,
10 that when these troops, which were still north of the
11 Great Wall, might withdraw within the Great Wall.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Slight addition: The
13 area north of the Great Wall being within the juris-
14 diction of the Kwantung Army.

15 Q Was that all he was supposed to do in
16 Tientsin?

17 A I haven't completed my reply yet.

18 Q Go ahead.

19 A This matter which I have already related to
20 you had been, I think, fully described by the witness
21 KATAKURA before this Tribunal. And one other point:
22 There was much information flowing into Manchuria to
23 the effect that Pu Yi was very desirous of returning
24 to his native country. Inasmuch as DOHIHARA was going
25 down on his assignment to Tientsin at that time, he was

1 given the additional assignment to ascertain whether
2 this reported desire of Pu Yi was true or false.

3 Q How did you find out, from HONJO or from
4 DOHIHARA, about the purpose of the trip?

5 A The assignment was made by the Commanding
6 General of the Kwantung Army. All those in the Staff
7 Office were informed of these developments.

8 Q Did you give any advice?

9 A Do you mean to Colonel DOHIHARA?

10 Q Yes.

11 A I did not give him any particular advice,
12 not being responsible for him in so far as our
13 positions were concerned, but, being friends, I should
14 think I told him not to overstrain himself in per-
15 forming his assignment, but that is about all.

16 Q But, you were in charge of Intelligence in
17 the Kwantung Army?

18 A As I think the Tribunal is already aware,
19 the Kwantung Army Headquarters at that time divided
20 the Staff Office into sections -- into such departments
21 as General Affairs Section, the First Section, the
22 Second Section, and so forth, and I was Chief of the
23 General Affairs Section, and the First Section handled
24 operations, and the Second Section Intelligence. My
25 job -- my official job being that of the Chief of the

1 General Affairs Section, naturally the intendance
2 officer was a subordinate of mine, and it was only
3 natural that I should give him orders with regard to
4 providing travelling expenses.

5 Q Now, Mr. ITAGAKI, you seem to have a clear
6 recollection of what KATAKURA testified before this
7 Tribunal. Let me ask you if you remember the reading
8 of exhibit 21696?

9 THE MONITOR: Is it 21696?

10 Q 2196, appearing on page, record 15,740. It
11 was a telegram from HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA, dated
12 November 12. The essence of it: that the Commander
13 of the Army on the 12th -- asking the Commander of the
14 Army on the 12th regarding Hsuan Tung coming to Man-
15 churia. He replied, saying that not only had he
16 heard nothing whatsoever but that he even had Staff
17 Officer ITAGAKI notify the Tientsin Garrison several
18 days before that they were not to hurry about the
19 Emperor's coming to Manchuria. Do you remember that?

20 A Yes, I have some recollection.

21 Q Did you notify DOHIHARA to quit?

22 A I was ordered by the Commanding General of
23 the Kwantung Army through the Chief of Staff to send
24 this telegram.
25

Q Now, what do you mean by saying that you told

1 DOHIHARA not to overstrain himself about it?

2 A Well, in connection with information and
3 intelligence in the Tientsin-Peiping area -- that is,
4 in collecting information and intelligence in the
5 Tientsin-Peiping area, there was -- it was not --
6 could not be denied that there would be no possibility
7 of some confusion being created as a result of a
8 possible troop withdrawal, and one could not say there
9 was no danger, and with such ideas in mind I used this
10 word. I told him not to overstrain himself.

11 Q Does that have anything to do in connection
12 with the taking of Hsuan Tung to Manchuria?

13 A It has no relation whatsoever, because the
14 assignment was to ascertain whether the Emperor Hsuan
15 Tung actually desired to go to Manchuria or not.

16 Q Now, you stated on page 27 that, "It is by
17 no means a fact that the Kwantung Army sent troops to
18 North China." Did the Kwantung Army ever occupy any
19 area outside of Manchuria?

20 A I presume that your question is related with
21 my affidavit, and so I should like to divide up the
22 question according to the relevant periods. What I
23 have stated in my affidavit is that there was nothing
24 of the kind while I was holding some office in the
25 Kwantung Army, either as Assistant Chief of Staff,

1 Chief of Staff, or Chief of Section.

2 Q Do you mean that during that time the
3 Kwantung Army never occupied any area outside of
4 Manchuria?

5 A That is what I meant.

6 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half
7 past nine tomorrow morning.

8 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjourn-
9 ment was taken until Thursday, 9 October
10 1947, at 0930.)
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